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INTERVIEW WITH PAUL WOODIE 
BY J. WATRAS 
JUNE 28, 1994 
JW: Mr. Woodie, I'd like to ask you some questions about 
the Dayton View Stabilization Project. 
PW: Okay. 
JW: You were saying that there were some simple reasons for 
leaving, or it ending? 
PW: Yes, one was the fact was the specialized funding 
ended. Code Enforcement ended. The other part was - do you want 
to stop? 
JW: Code Enforcement ended. 
PW: ... ended and it was rolled into the Model Cities, or 
city-wide Model Cities. 
JW: And Joe Wine became the task force manager of Model 
cities. 
RW: Right. Now the reason that that occurred was really 
very simple. The side office was staff, Carrie and I, wrote up 
the model, the city-wide Model Cities Program. 
JW: Oh, did you? 
RW: Yeah. And, if you look at the city-wide Model cities 
structure, it was designed after the Dayton View stabilization 
Project. And Wedge called the Dayton View Coalition area became 
the Northwest Priority Board; its Board, its constitution, was 
the same as that of the Dayton View Coalition, initially. And the 
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coordinator, the Priority Board Coordinator, was the same grade 
and job description of Joe's. 
JW: So the city-wide Model cities came more out of the 
Dayton View Stabilization Project than it does come out of the 
Model Cities Project? 
PW: Oh, absolutely. Oh, yeah. It's nothing but taking the 
Dayton View Stabilization Project and taking it and making it 
city-wide. That's exactly what it was. 
JW: My golly. 
PW: It was everything but the old Model cities area. 
Initially, the original Model cities area, was not a part of 
city-wide Model cities. It was separate and apart. It had its 
own planning council; it was not a part of the priority board 
system or anything. 
JW: So it didn't become a part of the city-wide until the 
priority boards? 
PW: No, way after that. Model Cities Planning Council 
continued to exist, even after the priority boards existed in the 
rest of the city. It was called the Neighborhood City Hall 
Concept. I actually did it with Carrie's help, and submitted it 
to Jim Kunde. And that became the grant application for the 
city-wide Model cities Program. It had a coordinator. We 
thought about the original structure of the city-wide Model 
cities Program. The side office was called the Side Office. The 
head of the Side Office was called the Coordinator, which is the 
same as Joe Wine's. There was an assistant coordinator, there 
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were specialists underneath, an Education person, like Percy and 
there was the physical person, ... 
JW: The Dayton View stabilization Project. 
PW: So there was no need; it really didn't end; it got 
folded in. carrie became the first coordinator of Northwest. 
She replaced Joe in effect. And then Joe came downtown and 
became the task force manager. The role of the task force 
manager was to take the issues areas, economic development, 
transportation, employment, and housing and integrate them. The 
task force manager was the manager who set up all the committee 
structures in the subject areas. And that's what Joe's role was, 
to add that dimension to it. Because Joe always complained that 
there was no coordinated effort in terms of all housing 
providers, and there was no coordination between transportation 
and housing and so he was made the task force manager and came 
downtown. 
JW: Okay, I see how it meant. Did he, then, have any 
relationship to what was going on in the Demonstration Project at 
Inner West, or was that ... ? 
PW: That was still separate. And then, I think, about 1974 
city-wide Model cities ended. Inner West Model Cities, like one 
year, in which it finally got folded in. And that staff got 
folded in. Because it was the year, let's see ... that Ron Gatton 
went to Washington. When did Jimmy Carter get elected? 1976. 
So Model cities got folded in about 1974, late 1974, and then Ron 
left to go over to Jimmy Carter. That would have been 1977. 
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JW: It was 1976 or 1977 when Model cities ended. 
PW: What did he go to Washington for? 
JW: Accusations about problems in Atlanta and other cities 
that were brought up as being disasters. And there was a 
campaign to save it, which seemed to have been built upon the 
Dayton experience. There was brochure that Dayton published to 
try to advertise the successes that we had here. 
PW: Yeah. Well, anyway, the reason I remember that, the 
important critical part, was that Charles Jones, who was, in 
effect, the director of the CVA, which was the original Model 
cities neighborhood, Inner West, he was the director who got 
folded into city-wide Model cities. So he then moved downtown. 
I remember when Charles moved downtown that's when they got 
consolidated. Because the offices were closed, in Inner West, 
and the administrative staff was moving into city hall, in the 
same offices as city-wide Model cities. So it became one Model 
cities program. It only lasted ... because I remember in 1975 
Model Cities disappeared. And all that staff was folded into the 
regular city operations. 
JW: And became priority boards, I guess. 
PW: Well, yeah. Now they didn't become priority boards; 
they came into all the departments of the city. 
JW: Oh. 
PW: The priority boards were just the coordinators and a 
few people. The other staff, and there were maybe 50 
professional staff people, got folded into the regular city 
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organization. Went to office of manage the budget; that was the 
director there; I took over the 701 Planning Process. The 
Government Relations, which was a grant writing process, liaison 
to Washington and to the state of Ohio and that kind of stuff. 
So that all became a part of the regular city organization in 
1975. 
JW: The Dayton View stabilization Project often claimed 
some relationship, or an effort, to improve the schools as well 
as to improve the neighborhoods, although it was Code Enforcement 
- Joe Wine somehow often pointed to the Multiple-motivation grant 
at Longfellow School. When I was talking to Carrie Zsombach, she 
said that there wasn't really much relationship between what went 
on in the schools and what went on in the Dayton View 
Stabilization Project. 
PW: Yeah, it depends on how you look at it. In terms of 
day-to-day operations, that's probably true. There was 
coordination; for example, at Longfellow School Multiple-
motivation operated ... what was her name? 
JW: Joanne Summers. 
PW: ... Joanne Summers was at Longfellow and Greg Caras -
they ran that program. The way we interfaced with that program 
was the side office was land, the Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund. She 
talked about that, but we then ran, connected, the social service 
efforts to the school. 
JW: Okay. 
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PW: Multiple-motivation was individual guided education of 
all kinds of specialized education components. But we did things 
like counsel families to try to come back to Good Sam Mental 
Health, which operated out of the Side Office. That person 
operated out of the Side Office and worked with children at 
Longfellow. Ran the Shoe Program. Gave tennis shoes to all the 
kids. It was called the Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund. That was 
funded by Model Cities and by the Side Office. By the Side 
Office and then by Model cities. So, while it's true ... 
JW: After Model cities became city-wide, not from money 
from the demonstration project ... 
PW: Each part of Model Cities received allocation and 
Northwest used its money to continue the projects funded at the 
Side Office, like the Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund, the Belke Trash 
Program, which was a Side Office project, that Joe ran. I think 
Good Sam, a little bit, was paid out of that money out of Model 
cities. So the effort of the Side Office was paid for when it 
was rolled in. There was no end to the Side Office. There has 
never been an end to the Side Office. The thing called the 
Dayton View Stabilization Side Office ended some day in August, 
1973, or something like that. The people and everything else, 
really rolled into the city-wide project. 
JW: That's a very nice way to think about it. I'm glad 
that that's what happened. The Dayton View Stabilization Project 
did become involved in schools where there were some 
disturbances; for example, in 1971 or 1972 there were some 
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disturbances at Jefferson and at Colonel White. And I guess the 
people gave tours or in-services to teachers who tried to provide 
some kind of conflict or resolution ... 
PW: Yes, we also had a youth council, the Detached Worker 
Program, which was John Weaver, who walked with the kids as they 
left the school building to make sure that they went home and 
didn't go in gangs. 
JW: Now that stuff didn't continue with the, or did it, 
with the city-wide Model cities Program? 
PW: Yes, all that continued. 
JW: Oh, my. So there is still that relationship with 
school programs. 
PW: The Detached Worker Program didn't end until 1980 
something. 
funded. Of 
I hired John Weaver when that program was no longer 
course, they were all upset about that. To this day 
the Priority Board screamed that the city disinvested in social 
service programming and they always use as an example the 
Detached Worker Program. That is an example of the city's 
abandonment. 
JW: So that was funded, then, by local funds rather than by 
federal funds? 
PW: No, it was funded by Model Cities. Oh, then by 
government selling block land funds. Model cities monies ended. 
Then, I guess it was Nixon, rolled up all the Model cities 
programs and all the categorical grant programs into block grants 
and there were general revenue sharing, community development 
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revenue sharing, health revenue sharing, educational revenue 
sharing the community development sharing continued in priority 
boards and certain programs. But what happened was that every 
year thereafter, I guess this is when Reagan became President, he 
did a slash job on all urban programs. So he slashed the 
community development block program, I don't know, maybe 40%. So 
that many of the functions, other than the hardcore housing 
efforts, had to be abandoned. So detached workers and the 
Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund went out the window. Because they also 
then put a kabosh on all social service programming because they 
were basically anti-social service programming. So they made us 
end all of those programs. Then the city was in a fiscal crisis 
so the city couldn't pick them up. So that's why Human Services 
all went down the tubes, but Code Enforcement continued. 
JW: NOw, the Code Enforcement grant offered, besides simply 
forcing people to refurbish or rehabilitate their ... 
PW: ... the old Code Enforcement ... 
JW: Yes, the original Code Enforcement grant offered low 
interest loans ... 
PW: Oh, yes, grants, street improvements ... 
JW: But there was some problem that there weren't many of 
them approved, or at least by 1972 or 1973, before the Dayton 
View Stabilization Program ended. 
PW: You mean nationally? 
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JW: No, in the Dayton View area you only have a handful of 
things approved, or at least according to one of the papers that 
I got. 
PW: I don't know. I wasn't involved in that whole portion 
of the program. That was really run downtown. The loans and 
grants programs were a part of the community, not by the Side 
Office. 
JW: One of the early planned proposals about the Dayton 
View Stabilization Project, well, Model cities as well, they both 
claim that they were among the first of the efforts to think of 
urban renewal in a broad, social sense. That instead of simply 
physical plan or land use, they thought about social services, 
such as employment, education, ... 
PW: Crime prevention ... 
JW: ... crime prevention. Is that true? Did that represent 
a real change? 
PW: Oh, yes. That was a dramatic change. 
JW: And was that something which was national or local? 
PW: It was originally local, because of what Dayton was at 
the time. And people like Joe and probably Graham Watt, who was 
the city manager, and Jeff Coe, who ran the community Research, 
Inc., which was the think tank of the community. And Jeff was 
extremely liberal, and very far-slighted in things like that. So 
we were probably on the cutting edge of all of that stuff, but 
eventually, that also got reflected in national We were 
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probably, early on and probably in other cities, while other 
cities sort of drug along, we were actually advocates for it. 
JW: Actually pushing in that direction, yeah. 
PW: So it came easy to us, as opposed to other cities where 
it was like revolution. 
JW: Now you had many visitors come to see the Dayton View 
Stabilization Program when it was begun; people from other cities 
as well as u.S. senators and representatives. 
PW: Yeah. I think the big difference here is that until 
that time in the '60's, those efforts were often considered 
minority efforts and if you thought about it, they were all black 
programs run by minorities, for minorities, and were adjuncts, 
arms-length away from cities. It was the way that central 
cities, dominated by whites, had not yet moved out, satisfied the 
national effort to provide something to minorities by throwing 
money at them and organizations which were never a part of the 
regular organizations. They didn't go through regular civil 
service, they weren't regular anything, regular employees; they 
weren't regular nothing. They were just federal employees forced 
upon us by the national government. That didn't happen here. 
JW: Well, it did in the sense of the Model cities 
Demonstration Grant. 
PW: Yes, because national policy encouraged it. But Dayton 
always resented it, resisted it. So we always had these other 
efforts, which were more integrative. 
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JW: There was a study - Marshall Gants and other - but 
anyway, HUD commissioned a comparative study of 11 cities of 
which Dayton was one, who received the initial planning grant for 
Model Cities. 
PW: Yeah. The original Model cities. 
JW: Yes. The Model cities Demonstration Project 1967. 
Score, I guess, wrote the original proposal. 
PW: Yeah, right; Score did. 
JW: In that comparative study, they said that Dayton was 
atypical in the sense of resident control; they had much more 
resident control than any other city. The Planning Council had 
much more say ... 
PW: Yes, that's always been true, though. That wasn't 
unusual. 
JW: It was something that was first run by the federal 
government, it was something that those residents deserved. 
PW: That's true today, though. I mean it falls into the 
study of the cease of the Human Development Block grant today and 
the role of the citizens in the capital planning process of the 
city, ours is not token. citizens actually make almost all of 
the proposals. I mean, people come here and they go, "Oh, yeah, 
we all have citizen committees." But our citizen committees 
actually make the decisions. So it's a lot different. It's 
always been that way here, though. 
JW: This particular comparative study, however, of which 
I'm speaking, warned that that might be a danger; they really 
11 
preferred parody, what they called "parody," that there was an 
equal sharing between the professionals and the residents. 
PW: Yes, that's a big issue here. That wasn't an Oberlin 
Institute study. Oberlin Institute, out of D.C.? Area ? 
Because ... 
JW: I don't remember that. I remember Marshall Gans, three 
letters ... Marshal Con Gans and ... a third name ... 
PW: The only reason I say that is because that was the 
Oberlin Institute, the think tank of D.C. 
JW: Oh, and it's a conservative group? 
PW: No, they're not conservative. But they did a lot of 
urban studies and their comment, always, through the 70's and 
80's about Dayton's budgetary process, the performance process, 
MBO process, about the way we rate departments, why merit 
increases that were so driven by public opinion and referendum 
notions, that we actually had gone overboard and destroyed 
professional decision-making. So a claim against the Model 
cities program is a claim against the way the city operates. 
That we're too responsive and that in fact what happens there's 
no confidence in planning process, there is no deductive 
reasoning on anything. Anything is, "Now, wait a minute; what's 
the last public opinion poll say?" It's like the worst form of 
bureaucracy in that you have no professional civil service, but 
what you have are civil servants which are totally subserviant to 
the committee of such-and-such. It's still going on today. 
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JW: And that's unusual since we were one of the cities to 
adopt the city manager system which was to take politics and 
public opinion out of city management. 
PW: People think it's a reaction to the fact that because 
we were strong city manager form, we had destroyed in our vicker 
to have a professional government in the teens, 20's, 30's, and 
40's, that we had destroyed all forms of politics. We were like 
rabid of non-partisans. And that you couldn't mention a political 
party in Dayton. If you put that on a poster, that was death of 
the candidate. 
JW: And there was the All-Dayton committee ... 
PW: The All-Dayton committee was supposed to be this nice 
group of people who decided for us, who should even run. 
JW: Yes, they did. 
PW: And no one ever succeeded in winning without their 
endorsement. 
JW: until 1969 when SOS came in. 
PW: Right, when SOS came in. So back in 1913 or 1915, 
because they actually lost the 1913 election, which caused the 
All-Dayton committee to be formed because the socialists actually 
won. The business community did not want to do that; they 
couldn't live with that so they formed this coalition with labor 
unions, the Democrats and Republicans, to keep everybody out. 
And they self-selected people for years. Well, what you have is 
this built-up resentment on the part of people who became 
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politically active, there was no way into the system. So when it 
went, it went big time. 
JW: And we're still ... 
PW: We're still into this small democracy thing. It's 
laughable when you read in the paper that the eastern study by a 
group of business people saying that this government is not 
responsive. What they mean by "this government is not 
responsive" is that this government is not responsive to the 
elite. This government disdains the elite in the business 
community. But they are very responsive to the citizens who live 
here. We all sit there and laugh because the opposite is the 
truth. This is a too-responsive government. We let the citizens 
decide what streets get closed without regards to good traffic 
patterns, we let citizens decide almost ... there is a point at 
which you're not doing your job as a civil servant. And I think 
that's always been in effect for the last 30 years. 
JW: When I looked at the Model cities Demonstration Project 
and in education when they were calling for black control of 
black schools, something which the school board would not give, 
it turned out that they were right, at least the court justified 
it, that would have been an illegal act. At any rate, I couldn't 
find that there were any sUbsistence of issues with the exception 
of personnel issues, that the black control of black schools 
would have meant. Is that to some extent true, about city 
issues? I guess you're saying no because you're saying that 
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traffic patterns are decided at a local level, and that would 
have been a sUbsistence issue. 
PW: Oh, yeah, these are all sUbsistence issues. 
JW: curriculum seemed not to have changed and the school 
board would have approved the curriculum that was brought in, 
with or without local control. 
PW: Yes. It clearly does affect the nature of city 
services. There is no doubt about that. 
JW: What would you say would be the most outstanding 
success of the Dayton View Stabilization Project? 
PW: I think probably in 2 areas: one is a sense of 
the city in a reasonable way as to citizen involvement and 
citizen decision-making. Model cities was probably pretty 
extreme and how it went about it. The Stabilization program 
tended to advocate the same kind of citizen involvement in city 
hall and in regular programming, but for all the wrong reasons. 
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JW: When they did it through the Dayton View Coalition? 
PW: Through the Coalition, through the contacts at city 
hall. In fact, I was hired, and this is to show how bizarre Joe 
was, he insisted that there be an analyst out there so that city 
hall became sensitized to real needs, by having somebody at city 
hall who was commissioned out there. If you read the articles, 
they always played that tune. In fact, he insisted that I report 
to somebody in city hall. So that I had to report back every 
week so that city hall became sensitized. This is Joe's vision. 
We always used to laugh. I remember one of the first things -
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carrie and I sat one night at the Coalition meeting and wrote 
down all the little things that Joe said and one was to sensitize 
the social service delivery system and bring this to the urban 
milieu. And there was this little plaque that we had made for 
Joe that said, "To sensitize the social service delivery system 
and to bring this to the urban milieu." When Joe retired, he 
gave me that plaque and I still have that plaque. And I'm the 
inheritor of whatever that means. Joe was always worried about 
institutionalizing things; changing the nature of the way people 
think. The Planning Council tended to be more separate in terms 
of we what control of the means of production, the hiring 
practices, the program itself. And Joe didn't want that. He 
always refused to run things. And that's why you have all this 
equivocation of strange stuff like Multiple-motivation. We 
didn't have much to do with them. Except Joe attended every damn 
meeting. Made us go to every meeting and made us advocate it at 
every single meeting. But he wanted the school board to do it. 
with Good Sam, he insisted that the city not hire the health 
person. The city farmed Good Sam, but the city insisted that 
Good Sam do what it's supposed to do for mental health. So Joe 
was always an advocate of getting institutions to do their job, 
getting united Way agencies to do what they're supposed to do, 
not doing for them, which is just the opposite of the Model 
cities experiment. Model cities was to duplicate what other 
agencies did by putting a new entity ... 
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JW: ... what they call satellite corporations. 
PW: ... satellite corporations. Joe was adamantly opposed 
to that concept. He believed in using the existing institutions 
and making them do what they're supposed to do. He was always 
for sabotaging and undermining the efforts of others. 
JW: I did interview him before he died, in much the same 
way that I'm interviewing you, and he once said that he set up 
the Dayton View Coalition to become a board of directors to 
protect himself from his employers, the city commission. 
PW: That's probably true. 
JW: So that these people were more radical than he was and 
he selected them through an institute called Malichi? 
PW: Yes, Malichi. 
JW: From Don Wicks at the theological seminary. And so he 
could go to the city commission of the city manager and say, 
"Well, this is what they want me to do." 
PW: "What can I do?" 
JW: Right, right. 
PW: He also made sure that the Coalition was composed of 
anybody who knew anybody and had any connection, either socially 
or , who lived in Dayton View. So it was also a network. 
He didn't think about that, because he didn't think about 
networking. But Joe knew that what he wanted was people of 
influence, who were radical, more radical than him, but also 
people who had contacts so that as soon as something happened in 
this whole force of people, like Mike Adler and I, would just 
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pounce on the world, albeit the media, albeit all city 
commissioners, whatever it may be. Get the MVRPC to do the 
Housing Dispersal plan, or whatever it may be. So they would be 
everywhere. And it created this force. Yes, Joe was very good 
at that. 
JW: It had a bias toward professionalism, which much have 
been .... You're talking about the Housing Dispersal Plan - that 
seemed to have been an important aspect of the Dayton View 
Stabilization Project, that people said that it would be 
impossible to succeed, where the only place where African-
Americans could buy homes would be Dayton View. 
PW: That's right. 
JW: So there was some effort to force the suburbs to 
accept ... 
PW: Which didn't work. 
JW: Why didn't it work? 
PW: Because people didn't want it to happen, that's why. 
The fact of the matter is, the politics ... I guess the problem was 
this. Those who were advocates for were mostly Dale Burch, white 
liberals who believed in playing a fair game. Also trusted 
peoples' motivations and statements. The fact is they followed 
John Locke when the rest of the world was following Hobbs. So 
they got out-maneuvered. 
JW: And the way they got out-maneuvered was that the 
different ... 
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PW: People would agree to anything. And not mean a word of 
it. 
JW: But there was no way to enforce the open housing, for 
example, of ... 
SIDE TWO 
PW: It would do so by saying that unless you got signed up 
in the Housing Dispersal Plan, your community cannot receive 
federal funds. That was their big stint. That held so long as 
there was a support for that policy in Washington. Which changed 
with the winds, depending on who was in the White House. There 
were also exceptions. Any time there was a big project along, 
the business community would advocate its leadership 
responsibility. "We'll do the Dispersal Plan. But not on this 
project. "We must have this ... you can't stop economic 
development for social programming." So they would make grand 
exceptions and everybody knew that they made grand exceptions and 
all these little burgs knew that all they had to do was rattle a 
few cages in the business community and the business community 
would give their bidding for them to make this an exception. So 
there really wasn't a buy-in. 
JW: There were, essentially, three different efforts - is 
that correct - to try to push fair housing or housing dispersal? 
PW: That number doesn't mean anything to me. 
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JW: There were 3 different proposals that I came across in 
the archives in the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission. 
It seems to be that 1971, 1973, and 1974 were the years. 
PW: Oh, three different proposals. Oh, okay. I remember 
that. That's probably true. It got updated, more joined, it got 
modified, that kind of stuff. I'm going back to an earlier point 
- you were saying what did the .. . 
JW: ... was its success .. . 
PW: ... success. One was, and not 100%, this whole notion 
of institutionalizing certain concepts of contemporary urban 
planning inside city hall institutions, departments, and all that 
and that was successful. Successful not because anybody ever 
measured it, but because the people who were involved in it, 
Joe's philosophy, the fact that Joe has a special role in city 
hall today is really in the minds of that set of directors who 
came out of that era and Joe was the father of. I think most 
people would recognize that Joe played this role of mentor for 
hundreds of people within city hall. 
JW: But he wasn't trained in urban policy, was he? 
PW: No. He was clearly, by far, the father, or whatever 
you want to call it, this person who almost anybody in city hall 
today, if you say "Joe Wine" they'll tell you all these fond 
memories they have of Joe, but they'll also tell you that Joe 
probably is the one person who had more influence on their 
thinking than anybody else. Including people who are not even 
here any more who are city managers in other cities. Who came 
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from Dayton. So Joe did institutionalize this notion. And the 
project did do these things inside city hall. City hall is 
dramatically different. 
JW: Did the project - now the way in which the plan states 
about Dayton View Stabilization Project is that 3 or 4 
neighborhood associations got together and they proposed this to 
Graham Watt who then proposed it to the city commission. Joe 
Wine was city commissioner; he resigned to become the director. 
That story seems to imply that this fell on Joe, the Dayton View 
Stabilization Project, that it simply was there and he took it. 
Did he do more than that? Did he create it? 
PW: Yes. 
JW: Did he encourage those neighborhood associations to 
make this proposal. This was his idea before he became city 
manager? 
PW: I can't imagine that it's not true. And that's the way 
Joe would have always done things. I don't know that for a fact 
because I wasn't here at the time, but why would it be any 
different? Joe always worked through other people; that was 
Joe's thing. Joe always got others to come to the realization. 
JW: That's amazing. 
pW: So if you look at it, everything happened that way. 
That's always why when you say what did the Dayton View 
Stabilization Program do, you start asking people and they say, 
"Well, now what control did you have of Multiple-motivation?" 
"None." "What control did you have over Good Sam?" "None." How 
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about the loans and grants programs? Were they an issue?" "No." 
"Out of the Side Office." "No." "Well, what did he do all day 
long?" Well, that's why he was hired. And that's why you can go 
through the newspapers and periodically throughout that entire 
era they'll be these little articles about what does he really 
do. 
JW: Oh, yeah, there were real complaints about his money. 
The city commission wanted ... 
PW: And what did he do? What did he do? You know what he 
did? He agitated them. Well, that's what he did. He agitated 
them; he would change public policies out of them; he would get 
hundreds of people to advocate the change in that public policy 
and it would be changed. And there would be resentment because 
they would say, "What did he do all day?" Well, that's what he 
did. He got everybody else to do everything. 
JW: By "all day" you mean 24 hours. 
PW: Literally. I worked so many hours, when I worked for 
Joe. And since you were required by federal law to record your 
hours, but I had so many hours that they owed me a year. And 
they couldn't pay it to me; where would they get the money. So I 
had to sign all these documents giving up my year ... No, Joe 
worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
JW: I think I noticed in the newspapers that he actually 
physically grew; that he was at first described as being 6'3" and 
by the time of his funeral, and Kap Haywood wrote his eulogy and 
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an article praising him, and he's 6'5". So just his stature must 
have ..• 
PW: That's probably true. Well, he also became a 
gentleman. Joe was this, when I first met him, people used to 
get mad. He also had the foulest language in public. So he would 
go to the meetings and just gross people out. And they would 
write letters about how can this person come to a public meeting 
and talk the way he does. They not only heard the gross words he 
used, they hated the words he used because the things he would 
say to people would ... l remember when he went to Southeast in my 
neighborhood and told them what a bunch of racists they were, 
people were in shock. They never expected anybody to actually 
tell them to their face that they were that way; they expected 
him to come and speak in sign language, which is the gentle way 
of doing it. And he didn't do that. As Joe got older he got 
gentler. 
language. 
So a lot of people remember Joe when he cleaned up his 
That was his very thoughtful kind of reserve person, 
which wasn't the Joe I knew. 
JW: I didn't meet him until he was ill, so I don't really 
know ... What did he do for a living before he became a city 
commissioner? 
PW: Joe was on the city commission in those days. Not only 
did the All-Dayton committee select who it would be, each 
corporation had their person. And, of course, the main 
corporations were Rikes, NCR and General Motors, and the labor 
union. There were always the labor union, AFL-ClO; there was 
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always somebody there representing the Rike-Kumler Co. and Joe 
was the personnel director of the Rike-Kumler Co. 
JW: Oh, that's where he worked. 
PW: And Joe was the one who busted Rikes. strangely 
enough, here's Joe being the personnel director of the Rike-
Kumler Co. - I don't know how he ever pulled this off - and he is 
leading the march on Rike-Kumler for their hiring practices. Now 
I don't know how in the hell he ... attacking his own corporation. 
And he's the personnel director? 
JW: Well, it was consistent with what he did in city hall, 
it seems. 
PW: Hmm, hmm. He literally marched on the building, onto 
the escalators with Jim McGee. Did you ever interview Jim McGee? 
JW: No, I have not met him yet. 
PW: Joe and Mayor McGee - because they're like •.. 
JW: Well, they were. 
PW: Oh, yeah. Jim McGee would know the entire history of 
the real Joe. 
JW: Now that's surprising because I have some articles when 
the Dayton View stabilization Project was proposed where McGee 
was then city commissioner and he was complaining that it was 
serving one neighborhood and not all. 
PW: I don't know what that means. But they were like the 
best of friends for life. There was nobody closer to Joe than 
Jim McGee. He can tell you about those days before me and Joe's 
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involvement in the civil rights movement, which is a pretty 
important part of all of this history. 
JW: That's where his interest in the Dayton View 
stabilization grant came from his ... 
PW: Oh, yes. Joe was very much involved in the civil 
rights movement. 
JW: Well, I always thought of the stabilization grant as 
the civil rights movement, actually. But I suppose you're 
thinking of it as urban renewal than you are thinking of it as 
civil rights. 
PW: Oh, no. Not the civil rights movement in Dayton in 
regards to busing Rike-Kumler, busting the theaters downtown -
Joe was involved in that. Black weren't allowed to go to the 
theaters downtown. Joe was involved in all of that; he was a 
hardcore civil rights activist. And him and Jim McGee and Don 
Crawford, were the crux of the commission at the time. Don was 
on the city commission with him, too. They can tell you that 
history. And that's the Joe they sort of remember, growing up 
with Joe. You can't basically deal with the stabilization thing 
unless you deal with Jim McGee and Don Crawford because both of 
them were city hall people looking down on Joe in the Dayton 
Stabilization Project as he came to the city commission meeting 
or sent people. So when McGee attacks Joe, it's tongue in cheek. 
Now the one thing about Jim McGee, it wouldn't matter if ... Jim 
McGee believed in certain things and if he thought that something 
was not right, it didn't matter if you were his best friend. 
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That's just the way he was. And if he felt like philosophically 
. 
there should not be a program that favored one neighborhood over 
another, he'd say that no ... he'd put you out on the job; he 
wouldn't care. That's just the way he was. He believed in 
property rights. He didn't care and he was opposed to housing 
inspectors going into peoples' houses without a warrant. That 
was unconstitutional and he didn't give a hoot if the damn house 
broke down. He believed in property. And you knew that if you 
did anything on the city commission, to propose anything that 
diminished anybody's property rights, he'd be oppose to it. 
That's just the way he was. He was a very good person. So that 
wouldn't mean anything. But he was also very supportive of Joe 
in his efforts. You understand that when city-wide Model Cities 
was created, everybody assumed that Joe was going to be the 
director of the city-wide program. I don't know if anybody told 
you about that. 
JW: No. 
PW: Because Carrie and I had written city-wide Model cities 
program and we both worked for Joe. It was assumed that Joe was 
going to be the director of the city-wide effort and that Carrie 
and I would then go work for Joe on the city-wide priority board 
effort. And Jim Kunde decided, for whatever reason, that he was 
going to bring in this person from Chicago, who was Ron Gant. The 
reason that Joe was moved downtown and did not remain as the 
coordinator was because it was assumed he was going to be 
director, they created his position called "Task Force Manager" 
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as a consolation prize for Joe. People forget that little 
history. And Joe was absolutely decimated that he was not 
appointed as the director. But what it was was that a lot of 
people in city hall, the old timers, that Joe had ... they finally 
could get one. 
JW: And they did. 
PW: And they did. Because it was like he had bugged them 
for 5 years, relentlessly, week after week, attacking every 
single director for some thing. And now they had a chance to 
make sure that he had to pay. 
JW: And he did. 
PW: And he did. 
JW: That's too bad. 
PW: That happens. And Joe was pretty philosophical 
afterwards about that. If you bug everybody, you pay. 
JW: Yeah. And if you describe his way of operating as 
instigating rather than creating, than he could do best as task 
force manager rather than director. 
PW: Right. 
JW: I really want to thank you for this. 
PW: You're welcome. 
JW: You've been very helpful. 
PW: Going down memory lane. There were a lot of those 
people who had different dimensions of the Stabilization program 
like Jim McGee or Don Crawford, or even Tim Reardon, who's now 
the action city manager. He worked for Joe, too. 
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JW: Oh, I didn't know that. 
PW: He was hired by Ron and then I hired Tim and then I put 
Tim under Joe. So they became very good friends. So Tim has a 
different perspective than I do. Because Tim is not an activist. 
So his view is more of Joe's creative aspect as opposed to his 
analytical abilities. He will give you this whole thing about 
how Joe couldn't add one and one. He was absolutely terrible. 
He never let Joe handle any money, because he could never keep 
track of it. It was just like he had no notion of money at all 
and it began with this dollar and ended with that dollar. So he 
never took care of anything budgetarily. Nothing to do with any 
numbers, because it didn't matter what the numbers were. Sixty 
percent of the people said this ... if it didn't serve his 
philosophical point, what then was the relevant data. He was 
absolutely terrible with data. 
JW: But he did try to use you to prove that the things they 
were doing would work. 
PW: Use, you see. Joe's view was not objective, 
analytical. And here's Tim, who's more open about this thing. 
But Tim was this pure analyst. He is the perfect analyst. 
That's why he's the finance director, the budget director. He is 
the person who believes ... I mean, if there's a religion, he does 
believe in analysis as the ultimate religion, I am sure. Because 
everything can be objectivized in Tim's mind; everything can be 
measured. And there is truth in numbers. Well, Joe would believe 
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that there is no truth in numbers except what you make of them. 
So they would be like this old ... 
JW: One thing that I found - you did a survey of voting 
responses to tax levies to show that the schools, in the 
multiple-motivation area, were supported by the parents who 
received that money. The newspapers, I guess, had been saying 
that Dayton View was opposed to tax levies and you were trying to 
show that, no, that it could take hold. I guess it was a problem 
with what you considered Dayton View and what areas were included 
in the ... and you were trying to show that multiple-motivation had 
a positive effect, at least on voting patterns. 
PW: Yes. 
JW: You know you were saying about the Dayton View 
Stabilization grant being folded into the Model Cities - I found 
a public opinion survey - was the public opinion service from 
downtown, from city hall? 
PW: Yeah, there was an independent agency that we funded. 
It began in 1970. 
JW: They surveyed the residents in Dayton View ... 
PW: Oh, there's Tim, and Clarence ... 
JW: ... And found in 1974 that most of the residents didn't 
think that they had an organization that stood for them. 
PW: In Dayton View? 
JW: Yeah. 
PW: In 1974? 
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JW: Yeah, which would be after the Stabilization Program 
was folded into the Model cities. 
PW: Yeah. I don't recall that but the Northwest Priority 
Board never took hold. To this day. 
JW: I served on it. 
PW: Of all the priority boards it was probably the weakest 
in terms of links back to the neighborhood; and it's always been 
that way. So that wouldn't surprise me at all. I remember 
because the Northwest Priority Board - well, now - but those 
neighborhood associations were never as strong as the neigborhood 
associations in the southeast. Joe said that they - there was a 
new view in those organizations - except for the Triangle 
Association, even today, most of them were not very strong 
neighborhood associations. Now College Hill is sort of coming 
along. But the Triangle was probably only the legitimate 
neighborhood association in terms of a neighborhood association 
as I would recognize them as being from the southeast. I'm 
talking about an organization where everybody is involved and 
everybody knows the organization and they either hate the people 
or the like the people. That's not true in the Northwest. So 
there's never been very much links. Besides that, Northwest 
doesn't get along together. 
JW: No, we don't. I live on Euclid, so it's my 
neighborhood. 
PW: I know that when they fund projects, for example, when 
they rank projects, they do not rank them based on any objective 
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criteria whatsoever. I could never look at that list and go, 
"They made a judgement about this. Oh, no. That's what we 
showed after the meeting." They're going to get somebody; 
they're going to make this a dumb project number one. It has 
nothing to do with the value, the intrinsic value. While in the 
southeast - I'm on that one because I live there - I get their 
list of projects, I know that they had made this judgement based 
on, things that I would not know, I have faith that what they 
told me is indeed a ranking that means something. And in 
Northwest there's liable to be all kinds of dead bodies along the 
way. 
JW: I want to thank you once again for taking all this 
time. You've been helpful. 
PW: ... kids went there. 
JW: You said that Lincoln School was the best example of an 
integrated education? 
PW: Yeah. I think of IGE .. 
JW: You think of IGE as an integrated .... why? 
PW: And so does everybody ... I don't know; I don't have kids 
so I can't respond. I only know that the executives in city hall 
who sent their kids to Lincoln were sending their kids to an 
integrated school that created the appropriate environment for 
integration. That's how they viewed it. They really linked the 
two concepts together. 
JW: They did or did not? 
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PW: They did, absolutely did. You can talk to the city 
manager, the former city manager, who is now in Illinois. And 
that's how he always referred to Lincoln. 
JW: The curriculum specialists who set up middle schools; 
for example, in Dayton Public Schools, they did use individually 
guided education but as a magnet to attract children. The racial 
integration came as a result of setting the environment; the 
curriculum was separate. They didn't necessarily reinforce each 
other. 
PW: I see. 
JW: But that's not the view that you were getting from the 
people around you? 
PW: Oh, yeah, absolutely not. 
